BP, Coast Guard Find No Sheen near Macondo

- BP, Coast Guard Find No Sheen near Macondo

Friday, August 26, 2011
BP plc

On Aug. 25, 2011, BP confirmed through a standard visual wellhead inspection that there is no release of oil from the Macondo well (MC252).

In addition, BP also conducted a visual inspection of the Macondo relief well confirming the same result.

Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) video inspection was conducted in the presence of representatives from the Gulf Coast Incident Management Team (GCIMT) (MC252 Unified Command) located in New Orleans. GCIMT members watching the live video feed included representatives of the US Coast Guard, the Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement, and representatives from the states of Louisiana, Mississippi and Florida.

The inspection was prompted by press reports that sheens of oil observed in the vicinity were from the Macondo well. The Macondo well was capped on July 15, 2010 and permanently killed by sealing the well and annulus with cement on Sept. 19, 2010. The well was later plugged and abandoned with the approval and oversight of the US government.

During the course of inspecting both wellheads, small, intermittent bubbles were observed emanating from cement ports at the base of the wellheads. These observations are consistent with testing and sampling performed last year that detected nitrogen bubbles, a residual byproduct of the nitrified foam used in setting the wells’ surface casing cement.

BP and the US Coast Guard have conducted multiple surveys of the area in recent days and found no evidence of oil sheens in the Macondo vicinity.

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Transocean Briefs Investigation Report on Causes of Macondo Incident

- Transocean Briefs Investigation Report on Causes of Macondo Incident

Wednesday, June 22, 2011
Transocean Ltd.

Transocean announced the release of an internal investigation report on the causes of the April 20, 2010, Macondo well incident in the Gulf of Mexico.

Following the incident, Transocean commissioned an internal investigation team comprised of experts from relevant technical fields and specialists in accident investigation to gather, review, and analyze the facts and information surrounding the incident to determine its causes.

The report concludes that the Macondo incident was the result of a succession of interrelated well design, construction, and temporary abandonment decisions that compromised the integrity of the well and compounded the likelihood of its failure. The decisions, many made by the operator, BP, in the two weeks leading up to the incident, were driven by BP's knowledge that the geological window for safe drilling was becoming increasingly narrow. Specifically, BP was concerned that downhole pressure -- whether exerted by heavy drilling mud used to maintain well control or by pumping cement to seal the well -- would exceed the fracture gradient and result in fluid losses to the formation, thus costing money and jeopardizing future production of oil.

The Transocean investigation team traced the causes of the Macondo incident to four overarching issues:

• Risk Management and Communication: Evidence indicates that BP failed to properly assess, manage and communicate risk to its contractors. For example, it did not properly communicate to the drill crew the absence of adequate testing on the cement or the uncertainty surrounding critical tests and procedures used to confirm the integrity of the barriers intended to inhibit the flow of hydrocarbons into the well. It is the view of the investigation team that the actions of the drill crew on April 20, 2010, reflected the crew's understanding that the well had been properly cemented and successfully tested.
• Well Design and Construction: The precipitating cause of the Macondo incident was the failure of the downhole cement to isolate the reservoir, which allowed hydrocarbons to enter the wellbore. Without the failure of the cement barrier, hydrocarbons would not have entered the well or reached the rig. While drilling the Macondo well, BP experienced both lost circulation events and kicks and stopped short of the well's planned total depth because of an increasingly narrow window for safe drilling, specifically a limited margin between the pore pressure and fracture gradients. In the context of these delicate conditions, cementing a long-string casing would increase the risk of exceeding the margin for safe drilling. But rather than adjusting the production casing design to avoid this risk, BP adopted a technically complex nitrogen foam cement program that allowed it to retain its original casing design. The resulting cement program was of minimal quantity, left little margin for error, and was not tested adequately before or after the cementing operation. Further, the integrity of the cement may have been compromised by contamination, instability and an inadequate number of devices used to center the casing in the wellbore.
• Risk Assessment and Process Safety: Based on the evidence, the investigation team determined that BP failed to properly require or confirm critical cement tests or conduct adequate risk assessments during various operations at Macondo. Halliburton and BP did not adequately test the cement slurry program, despite the inherent complexity, difficulties and risks associated with the design and implementation of the program and some test data showing that the cement would not be stable. BP also failed to assess the risk of the temporary abandonment procedure used at Macondo, generating at least five different temporary abandonment plans for the Macondo well between April 12, 2010 and April 20, 2010. After this series of last-minute alterations, BP proceeded with a temporary abandonment plan that created unnecessary risk and did not have the required approval by the MMS. Most significantly, the final plan called for underbalancing the well before conducting a negative pressure test to verify the integrity of the downhole cement or setting a cement plug to act as an additional barrier to flow. It does not appear that BP used risk assessment procedures or prepared Management of Change documents for these decisions or otherwise addressed these risks and the potential adverse effects on personnel and process safety.

Operations

• Negative Pressure Test: The results of the critical negative pressure test were misinterpreted. Post-incident investigation determined that the negative test was inadequately set up because of displacement calculation errors, a lack of adequate fluid volume monitoring, and a lack of management of change discipline when the well monitoring arrangements were switched during the test. It is now apparent that the negative pressure test results should not have been approved, but no one involved in the negative pressure test recognized the errors. BP approved the negative pressure test results and decided to move forward with temporary abandonment. The well became underbalanced during the final displacement, and hydrocarbons began entering the wellbore through the faulty cement barrier and a float collar that likely failed to convert. None of the individuals monitoring the well, including the Transocean drill crew, initially detected the influx.
• Well Control: With the benefit of hindsight and a thorough analysis of the data available to the investigation team, several indications of an influx during final displacement operations can be identified. Given the death of the members of the drill crew and the loss of the rig and its monitoring systems, it is not known which information the drill crew was monitoring or why the drill crew did not detect a pressure anomaly until approximately 9:30 p.m. on April 20, 2010. At 9:30 p.m., the drill crew acted to evaluate an anomaly. Upon detecting an influx of hydrocarbon by use of the trip tank, the drill crew undertook well-control activities that were consistent with their training including the activation of various components of the BOP. By the time actions were taken, hydrocarbons had risen above the blowout preventer and into the riser, resulting in a massive release of gas and other fluids that overwhelmed the mud gas separator system and released high volumes of gas onto the aft deck of the rig. The resulting ignition of this gas cloud was inevitable.
• Blowout Preventer (BOP): Forensic evidence from independent post-incident testing by Det Norske Veritas (DNV) and evaluation by the Transocean investigation team confirm that the Deepwater Horizon BOP was properly maintained and operated. However, it was overcome by the extreme dynamic flow, the force of which pushed the drill pipe upward, washed or eroded the drill pipe and other rubber and metal elements, and forced the drill pipe to bow within the BOP. This prevented the BOP from completely shearing the drill pipe and sealing the well.
• Alarms, Muster, and Evacuation: In the explosions and fire, the general alarm was activated, and appropriate emergency actions were taken by the Deepwater Horizon marine crew. The 115 personnel who survived the initial blast mustered and evacuated the rig to the offshore supply vessel Damon B. Bankston.

The Transocean internal investigation team began its work in the days immediately following the incident. Through an extensive investigation, the team interviewed witnesses, reviewed available information regarding well design and execution, examined well monitoring data that had been transmitted real-time from the rig to BP, consulted industry and technical experts, and evaluated available physical evidence and third-party testing reports.

The loss of evidence with the rig and the unavailability of certain witnesses limited the investigation and analysis in some areas. The team used its cumulative years of experience but did not speculate in the absence of evidence. The report of the team does not represent the legal position of Transocean, nor does it attempt to assign legal responsibility or fault.

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BP, MOEX Agree to $1.1B Settlement for Macondo Spill

- BP, MOEX Agree to $1.1B Settlement for Macondo Spill

Friday, May 20, 2011
BP plc

BP has reached agreement with MOEX and its affiliates, Mitsui Oil Exploration and MOEX USA, to settle all claims between the companies related to the Deepwater Horizon accident.

MOEX - which had a ten percent interest in the Macondo well - has joined BP in recognizing and acknowledging the findings by the Presidential Commission that the accident was the result of a number of separate risk factors, oversights and outright mistakes by multiple parties and a number of causes. Like BP, MOEX Offshore has also recognized and acknowledged the conclusions of the United States Coast Guard that, among other things, the safety management systems of both Transocean and its Deepwater Horizon rig had significant deficiencies that rendered them ineffective in preventing the accident. MOEX has concluded that entering into a settlement with BP is in its best interest. The agreement is not an admission of liability by any party regarding the accident.

Under the settlement agreement, MOEX USA Corporation, the parent company of MOEX Offshore 2007, will pay BP $ 1.065 billion. BP will immediately apply the payment to the $20 billion trust it established to meet individual, business and government claims, as well as the cost of the Natural Resource Damages.

The parties have also agreed to mutual releases of claims against each other. BP has agreed to indemnify MOEX for compensatory claims arising from the accident. BP's indemnity excludes civil, criminal or administrative fines and penalties, claims for punitive damages, and certain other claims.

"This settlement is an important step forward for BP and the Gulf communities," said BP group chief executive Bob Dudley. "MOEX is the first company to join BP in helping to meet our shared responsibilities in the Gulf, and Mitsui, through MOEX USA Corporation, is showing great corporate citizenship in standing behind its affiliate and making a contribution to meet the costs of this tragic accident. We call on the other parties involved in the Macondo well to follow the lead of the MOEX and Mitsui parties."

BP and the Mitsui group are committed to enhancing their business relationship globally now that the issues surrounding the Macondo well have been resolved between the two companies.

Today's settlement is the most recent step BP has taken to raise funds to help BP meet its commitments in the Gulf of Mexico. BP has so far concluded agreements for asset divestments totaling approximately $25 billion, and has recently announced that it will also divest a number of operated oil and gas fields in the UK and two of its US refineries - Texas City and Carson - along with their associated marketing interests.

BP is also working to ensure that the other parties involved in the Macondo well - notably, Transocean, which owned and operated the Deepwater Horizon rig; Halliburton, which designed and pumped the unstable cement that the Presidential Commission found was a key cause of the accident; and Anadarko, which owned 25 percent of the project - contribute appropriately. From the outset, BP has committed to paying all legitimate claims and fulfilling its obligations to the Gulf communities under the Oil Pollution Act. To date, BP has paid nearly $6 billion in claims.

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Transocean Execs Donating Portion of Bonuses To Victims (RIG)

Transocean Execs Donating Portion of Bonuses To Victims (RIG)

Transocean's (NYSE:RIG) senior management team said last night they would donate the portion of their bonuses they earned from getting good marks on internal safety metrics to the families of the 11 men killed in last years Deepwater Horizon tragedy.

The donation will be made to the Deepwater Horizon Memorial Fund, established last year in the wake of the disaster, for donations by coworkers and friends to help the families of the 11 men lost in the accident.

The non-deductible sum will exceed $250,000. More than $1.6 million has already been distributed to the families to date.

"Nothing is more important to Transocean than our people, and it was never our intent to diminish the effect the Macondo tragedy has had on those who lost loved ones," said Steven Newman, chief executive, announcing the bonus donations, in a news release on Tuesday. "The executive team made this decision because we believe it is the right thing to do."